Argumentation Theory
Contents

Articles

Argumentation theory 1
Argument 10
Charles Arthur Willard 17
Social epistemology 18
Sociology of knowledge 20
Doug Walton 24
Informal logic 26
Joseph W. Wenzel 31
Daniel J. O'Keefe 32
G. Thomas Goodnight 33
Robin Rowland 33
Dale Hample 34
C. Scott Jacobs 36
Sally Jackson 37
David Zarefsky 38
Ralph Johnson (philosopher) 40
Michael Scriven 43
John Woods (logician) 44

References

Article Sources and Contributors 46

Article Licenses

License 47
Argumentation theory

Argumentation theory, or argumentation, is the interdisciplinary study of how conclusions can be reached through logical reasoning; that is, claims based, soundly or not, on premises. It includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, dialogue, conversation, and persuasion. It studies rules of inference, logic, and procedural rules in both artificial and real world settings.

Argumentation includes debate and negotiation which are concerned with reaching mutually acceptable conclusions. It also encompasses eristic dialog, the branch of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal. This art and science is often the means by which people protect their beliefs or self-interests in rational dialogue, in common parlance, and during the process of arguing.

Argumentation is used in law, for example in trials, in preparing an argument to be presented to a court, and in testing the validity of certain kinds of evidence. Also, argumentation scholars study the post hoc rationalizations by which organizational actors try to justify decisions they have made irrationally.

Key components of argumentation

- Understanding and identifying arguments, either explicit or implied, and the goals of the participants in the different types of dialogue.
- Identifying the premises from which conclusions are derived
- Establishing the "burden of proof" — determining who made the initial claim and is thus responsible for providing evidence why his/her position merits acceptance
- For the one carrying the "burden of proof", the advocate, to marshal evidence for his/her position in order to convince or force the opponent's acceptance. The method by which this is accomplished is producing valid, sound, and cogent arguments, devoid of weaknesses, and not easily attacked.
- In a debate, fulfillment of the burden of proof creates a burden of rejoinder. One must try to identify faulty reasoning in the opponent's argument, to attack the reasons/premises of the argument, to provide counterexamples if possible, to identify any fallacies, and to show why a valid conclusion cannot be derived from the reasons provided for his/her argument.

Internal structure of arguments

Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising the following

1. a set of assumptions or premises
2. a method of reasoning or deduction and
3. a conclusion or point.

An argument must have at least one premise and one conclusion.

Often classical logic is used as the method of reasoning so that the conclusion follows logically from the assumptions or support. One challenge is that if the set of assumptions is inconsistent then anything can follow logically from inconsistency. Therefore it is common to insist that the set of assumptions be consistent. It is also good practice to require the set of assumptions to be the minimal set, with respect to set inclusion, necessary to infer the consequent. Such arguments are called MINCON arguments, short for minimal consistent. Such argumentation has been applied to the fields of law and medicine. A second school of argumentation investigates abstract arguments, where 'argument' is considered a primitive term, so no internal structure of arguments is taken on account.

In its most common form, argumentation involves an individual and an interlocutor/or opponent engaged in dialogue, each contending differing positions and trying to persuade each other. Other types of dialogue in addition
Argumentation theory

Argumentation and the grounds of knowledge

Argumentation theory had its origins in foundationalism, a theory of knowledge (epistemology) in the field of philosophy. It sought to find the grounds for claims in the forms (logic) and materials (factual laws) of a universal system of knowledge. But argument scholars gradually rejected Aristotle's systematic philosophy and the idealism in Plato and Kant. They questioned and ultimately discarded the idea that argument premises take their soundness from formal philosophical systems. The field thus broadened.\[1\]

Karl R. Wallace's seminal essay, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons" in the Quarterly Journal of Speech (1963) 44, led many scholars to study "marketplace argumentation" - the ordinary arguments of ordinary people. The seminal essay on marketplace argumentation is Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortensen,"Logic and Marketplace Argumentation" Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 143-150.\[2\]\[3\] This line of thinking led to a natural alliance with late developments in the sociology of knowledge.\[4\] Some scholars drew connections with recent developments in philosophy, namely the pragmatism of John Dewey and Richard Rorty. Rorty has called this shift in emphasis "the linguistic turn".

In this new hybrid approach argumentation is used with or without empirical evidence to establish convincing conclusions about issues which are moral, scientific, epistemic, or of a nature in which science alone cannot answer. Out of pragmatism and many intellectual developments in the humanities and social sciences, "non-philosophical" argumentation theories grew which located the formal and material grounds of arguments in particular intellectual fields. These theories include informal logic, social epistemology, ethnomethodology, speech acts, the sociology of knowledge, the sociology of science, and social psychology. These new theories are not non-logical or anti-logical. They find logical coherence in most communities of discourse. These theories are thus often labeled "sociological" in that they focus on the social grounds of knowledge.

Approaches to argumentation in communication and informal logic

In general, the label "argumentation" is used by communication scholars such as (to name only a few: Wayne E. Brockriede, Douglas Ehninger, Joseph W. Wenzel, Richard Rieke, Gordon Mitchell, Carol Winkler, Eric Gander, Dennis S. Gouran, Daniel J. O'Keefe, Mark Aakhus, Bruce Gronbeck, James Klump, G. Thomas Goodnight, Robin Rowland, Dale Hample, C. Scott Jacobs, Sally Jackson, David Zarefsky, and Charles Arthur Willard) while the term "informal logic" is preferred by philosophers, stemming from University of Windsor philosophers Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair. Harald Wohlrapp developed a criterion for validity (Geltung, Gültigkeit) as freedom of objections.

Trudy Govier, Douglas Walton, Michael Gilbert, Harvey Seigal, Michael Scriven, and John Woods (to name only a few) are other prominent authors in this tradition. Over the past thirty years, however, scholars from several disciplines have co-mingled at international conferences such as that hosted by the University of Amsterdam (the Netherlands) and the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Other international conferences are the biannual conference held at Alta, Utah sponsored by the (US) National Communication Association and American Forensics Association and conferences sponsored by the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA).

Some scholars (such as Ralph H. Johnson) construe the term "argument" narrowly, as exclusively written discourse or even discourse in which all premises are explicit. Others (such as Michael Gilbert) construe the term "argument" broadly, to include spoken and even nonverbal discourse, for instance the degree to which a war memorial or propaganda poster can be said to argue or "make arguments." The philosopher Stephen E. Toulmin has said that an
argument is a claim on our attention and belief, a view that would seem to authorize treating, say, propaganda posters as arguments. The dispute between broad and narrow theorists is of long standing and is unlikely to be settled. The views of the majority of argumentation theorists and analysts fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Kinds of argumentation

Conversational argumentation

The study of naturally-occurring conversation arose from the field of sociolinguistics. It is usually called conversation analysis. Inspired by ethnomethodology, it was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally by the sociologist Harvey Sacks and, among others, his close associates Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson. Sacks died early in his career, but his work was championed by others in his field, and CA has now become an established force in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech-communication and psychology.[5] It is particularly influential in interactional sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and discursive psychology, as well as being a coherent discipline in its own right. Recently CA techniques of sequential analysis have been employed by phoneticians to explore the fine phonetic details of speech.

Empirical studies and theoretical formulations by Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, and several generations of their students, have described argumentation as a form of managing conversational disagreement within communication contexts and systems that naturally prefer agreement.

Mathematical argumentation

The basis of mathematical truth has been the subject of long debate. Frege in particular sought to demonstrate (see Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, 1884, and Logicism in Philosophy of mathematics) that arithmetical truths can be derived from purely logical axioms and therefore are, in the end, logical truths. The project was developed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica. If an argument can be cast in the form of sentences in Symbolic Logic, then it can be tested by the application of accepted proof procedures. This has been carried out for Arithmetic using Peano axioms. Be that as it may, an argument in Mathematics, as in any other discipline, can be considered valid only if it can be shown that it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.

Scientific argumentation

Perhaps the most radical statement of the social grounds of scientific knowledge appears in Alan G.Gross's The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Gross holds that science is rhetorical "without remainder," meaning that scientific knowledge itself cannot be seen as an idealized ground of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is produced rhetorically, meaning that it has special epistemic authority only insofar as its communal methods of verification are trustworthy. This thinking represents an almost complete rejection of the foundationalism on which argumentation was first based.

Legal argumentation

Legal arguments are spoken presentations to a judge or appellate court by a lawyer, or parties when representing themselves of the legal reasons why they should prevail. Oral argument at the appellate level accompanies written briefs, which also advance the argument of each party in the legal dispute. A closing argument, or summation, is the concluding statement of each party's counsel reiterating the important arguments for the trier of fact, often the jury, in a court case. A closing argument occurs after the presentation of evidence.
**Political argumentation**

Political arguments are used by academics, media pundits, candidates for political office and government officials. Political arguments are also used by citizens in ordinary interactions to comment about and understand political events. The rationality of the public is a major question in this line of research. Political scientist Samuel L. Popkin coined the expression "low information voters" to describe most voters who know very little about politics or the world in general.

In practice, a "low information voter" may not be aware of legislation that their representative has sponsored in Congress. A low-information voter may base their ballot box decision on a media sound-bite, or a flier received in the mail. It is possible for a media sound-bite or campaign flier to present a political position for the incumbent candidate that completely contradicts the legislative action taken in Washington D.C. on behalf of the constituents. It may only take a small percentage of the overall voting group who base their decision on the inaccurate information, a voter block of 10 to 12%, to swing an overall election result. When this happens, the constituency at large may have been duped or fooled. Nevertheless, the election result is legal and confirmed. Savvy Political consultants will take advantage of low-information voters and sway their votes with disinformation because it can be easier and sufficiently effective. Institutions such as factcheck.org have come about in recent years to help counter the effects of such campaign tactics. Factcheck.org's stated goal is "We aim to reduce the level of deception and confusion in U.S. politics, for voters."

**Psychological aspects**

Psychology has long studied the non-logical aspects of argumentation. For example, studies have shown that simple repetition of an idea is often a more effective method of argumentation than appeals to reason. Propaganda often utilizes repetition. Nazi rhetoric has been studied extensively as, inter alia, a repetition campaign.

Empirical studies of communicator credibility and attractiveness, sometimes labeled *charisma*, have also been tied closely to empirically-occurring arguments. Such studies bring argumentation within the ambit of persuasion theory and practice.

Some psychologists such as William J. McGuire believe that the syllogism is the basic unit of human reasoning. They have produced a large body of empirical work around McGuire's famous title "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships." A central line of this way of thinking is that logic is contaminated by psychological variables such as "wishful thinking," in which subjects confound the likelihood of predictions with the desirability of the predictions. People hear what they want to hear and see what they expect to see. If planners want something to happen they see it as likely to happen. Thus planners ignore possible problems, as in the American experiment with prohibition. If they hope something will not happen, they see it as unlikely to happen. Thus smokers think that they personally will avoid cancer. Promiscuous people practice unsafe sex. Teenagers drive recklessly.

**Theories**

**Argument fields**

Stephen E. Toulmin and Charles Arthur Willard have championed the idea of argument fields, the former drawing upon Ludwig Wittgenstein's notion of language games, (Sprachspiel) the latter drawing from communication and argumentation theory, sociology, political science, and social epistemology. For Toulmin, the term "field" designates discourses within which arguments and factual claims are grounded. For Willard, the term "field" is interchangeable with "community," "audience," or "readership." Along similar lines, G. Thomas Goodnight has studied "spheres" of argument and sparked a large literature created by younger scholars responding to or using his ideas. The general tenor of these field theories is that the premises of arguments take their meaning from social communities.
Field studies might focus on social movements, issue-centered publics (for instance, pro-life versus pro-choice in the abortion dispute), small activist groups, corporate public relations campaigns and issue management, scientific communities and disputes, political campaigns, and intellectual traditions. In the manner of a sociologist, ethnographer, anthropologist, participant-observer, and journalist, the field theorist gathers and reports on real-world human discourses, gathering case studies that might eventually be combined to produce high-order explanations of argumentation processes. This is not a quest for some master language or master theory covering all specifics of human activity. Field theorists are agnostic about the possibility of a single grand theory and skeptical about the usefulness of such a theory. Theirs is a more modest quest for "mid-range" theories that might permit generalizations about families of discourses.

Stephen E. Toulmin's Contributions

By far, the most influential theorist has been the late Stephen E. Toulmin, the Cambridge educated philosopher and student of Wittgenstein. What follows below is a sketch of his ideas.

An Alternative to Absolutism and Relativism

Toulmin has argued that absolutism (represented by theoretical or analytic arguments) has limited practical value. Absolutism is derived from Plato's idealized formal logic, which advocates universal truth; thus absolutists believe that moral issues can be resolved by adhering to a standard set of moral principles, regardless of context. By contrast, Toulmin asserts that many of these so-called standard principles are irrelevant to real situations encountered by human beings in daily life.

To describe his vision of daily life, Toulmin introduced the concept of argument fields; in *The Uses of Argument* (1958), Toulmin states that some aspects of arguments vary from field to field, and are hence called "field-dependent," while other aspects of argument are the same throughout all fields, and are hence called "field-invariant." The flaw of absolutism, Toulmin believes, lies in its unawareness of the field-dependent aspect of argument; absolutism assumes that all aspects of argument are field invariant.

Toulmin's theories resolve to avoid the defects of absolutism without resorting to relativism: relativism, Toulmin asserted, provides no basis for distinguishing between a moral or immoral argument. In *Human Understanding* (1972), Toulmin suggests that anthropologists have been tempted to side with relativists because they have noticed the influence of cultural variations on rational arguments; in other words, the anthropologist or relativist overemphasizes the importance of the "field-dependent" aspect of arguments, and becomes unaware of the "field-invariant" elements. In an attempt to provide solutions to the problems of absolutism and relativism, Toulmin attempts throughout his work to develop standards that are neither absolutist nor relativist for assessing the worth of ideas.

Toulmin believes that a good argument can succeed in providing good justification to a claim, which will stand up to criticism and earn a favourable verdict.

Components of argument

In *The Uses of Argument* (1958), Toulmin proposed a layout containing six interrelated components for analyzing arguments:

1. Claim: Conclusions whose merit must be established. For example, if a person tries to convince a listener that he is a British citizen, the claim would be "I am a British citizen." (1)
2. Data: The facts we appeal to as a foundation for the claim. For example, the person introduced in 1 can support his claim with the supporting data "I was born in Bermuda." (2)
3. Warrant: The statement authorizing our movement from the data to the claim. In order to move from the data established in 2, "I was born in Bermuda," to the claim in 1, "I am a British citizen," the person must supply a warrant to bridge the gap between 1 & 2 with the statement "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British
Argumentation theory

4. Backing: Credentials designed to certify the statement expressed in the warrant; backing must be introduced when the warrant itself is not convincing enough to the readers or the listeners. For example, if the listener does not deem the warrant in 3 as credible, the speaker will supply the legal provisions as backing statement to show that it is true that "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British Citizen."

5. Rebuttal: Statements recognizing the restrictions to which the claim may legitimately be applied. The rebuttal is exemplified as follows, "A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen, unless he has betrayed Britain and has become a spy of another country."

6. Qualifier: Words or phrases expressing the speaker's degree of force or certainty concerning the claim. Such words or phrases include "possible," "probably," "impossible," "certainly," "presumably," "as far as the evidence goes," or "necessarily." The claim "I am definitely a British citizen" has a greater degree of force than the claim "I am a British citizen, presumably."

The first three elements "claim," "data," and "warrant" are considered as the essential components of practical arguments, while the second triad "qualifier," "backing," and "rebuttal" may not be needed in some arguments.

When first proposed, this layout of argumentation is based on legal arguments and intended to be used to analyze the rationality of arguments typically found in the courtroom; in fact, Toulmin did not realize that this layout would be applicable to the field of rhetoric and communication until his works were introduced to rhetoricians by Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger. Only after he published Introduction to Reasoning (1979) were the rhetorical applications of this layout mentioned in his works.

The Evolution of Knowledge

Toulmin's Human Understanding (1972) asserts that conceptual change is evolutionary. This book attacks Thomas Kuhn's explanation of conceptual change in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn held that conceptual change is a revolutionary (as opposed to an evolutionary) process in which mutually exclusive paradigms compete to replace one another. Toulmin criticizes the relativist elements in Kuhn's thesis, as he points out that the mutually exclusive paradigms provide no ground for comparison; in other words, Kuhn's thesis has made the relativists' error of overemphasizing the "field variant" while ignoring the "field invariant," or commonality shared by all argumentation or scientific paradigms.

Toulmin proposes an evolutionary model of conceptual change comparable to Darwin's model of biological evolution. On this reasoning, conceptual change involves innovation and selection. Innovation accounts for the appearance of conceptual variations, while selection accounts for the survival and perpetuation of the soundest conceptions. Innovation occurs when the professionals of a particular discipline come to view things differently from their predecessors; selection subjects the innovative concepts to a process of debate and inquiry in what Toulmin considers as a "forum of competitions." The soundest concepts will survive the forum of competition as replacements or revisions of the traditional conceptions.

From the absolutists' point of view, concepts are either valid or invalid regardless of contexts; from a relativists' perspective, one concept is neither better nor worse than a rival concept from a different cultural context. From Toulmin's perspective, the evaluation depends on a process of comparison, which determines whether or not one concept will provide improvement to our explanatory power more so than its rival concepts.
Rejection of Certainty

In *Cosmopolis* (1990), Toulmin traces the Quest for Certainty back to Descartes and Hobbes, and lauds Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Rorty for abandoning that tradition.

Pragma-dialectics

Scholars at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands have pioneered a rigorous modern version of dialectic under the name *pragma-dialectics*. The intuitive idea is to formulate clearcut rules that, if followed, will yield rational discussion and sound conclusions. Frans H. van Eemeren, the late Rob Grootendorst, and many of their students have produced a large body of work expounding this idea.

The dialectical conception of reasonableness is given by ten rules for critical discussion, all being instrumental for achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion (from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 182-183). The theory postulates this as an ideal model, and not something one expects to find as an empirical fact. The model can however serve as an important heuristic and critical tool for testing how reality approximates this ideal and point to where discourse goes wrong, that is, when the rules are violated. Any such violation will constitute a fallacy. Albeit not primarily focused on fallacies, pragma-dialectics provides a systematic approach to deal with them in a coherent way.

Artificial intelligence

Efforts have been made within the field of artificial intelligence to perform and analyze the act of argumentation with computers. Argumentation has been used to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for non-monotonic logic, starting with the influential work of Dung (1995). Computational argumentation systems have found particular application in domains where formal logic and classical decision theory are unable to capture the richness of reasoning, domains such as law and medicine. In Elements of Argumentation, Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter introduce techniques for formalizing deductive argumentation in artificial intelligence, emphasizing emerging formalizations for practical argumentation. A comprehensive overview of this area can be found in a recent book edited by Iyad Rahwan and Guillermo R. Simari.

Within Computer Science, the ArgMAS workshop series (Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems), the CMNA workshop series, and now the COMMA Conference are regular annual events attracting participants from every continent. The journal Argument & Computation is dedicated to exploring the intersection between argumentation and computer science.

Notes


Argumentation theory

[18] Computational Models of Natural Argument (http://www.cmna.info)
[19] Computational Models of Argument (http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/~comma/)

Sources


• Stephen Toulmin. The uses of argument. 1959.

• Stephen Toulmin. The Place of Reason in Ethics. 1964.


Further reading

Flagship journals:

- Argumentation
- Informal Logic
- Argumentation and Advocacy (formerly Journal of the American Forensic Association)
- Social Epistemology
- Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology
- Journal of Argument and Computation

External links

- Universiteit Utrecht (http://www.cs.uu.nl/people/henry/research/argtheory.html) (Dutch)
- Universiteit Twente (http://www.tcw.utwente.nl/theorieenoverzicht/Levels of theories/micro/Argumentation Theory.doc/) (Dutch)
- Argumentum.ch (http://www.argumentum.ch), E-course of Argumentation Theory for the Human and Social Sciences
- Interview with Stephen Toulmin in JAC (http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V13_I2_Olson_Toulmin.htm)

Argument

In philosophy and logic, an argument is an attempt to persuade someone of something, by giving reasons or evidence for accepting a particular conclusion. The general structure of an argument in a natural language is that of premises (typically in the form of propositions, statements or sentences) in support of a claim: the conclusion. Many arguments can also be formulated in a formal language. An argument in a formal language shows the logical form of the natural language arguments obtained by its interpretations.

In a typical deductive argument, the premises are meant to provide a guarantee of the truth of the conclusion, while in an inductive argument, they are thought to provide reasons supporting the conclusion's probable truth. The standards for evaluating other kinds of arguments may rest on different or additional criteria than truth, however, such as the persuasiveness of so-called "indispensability claims" in transcendental arguments or even the disclosure of new possibilities for thinking and acting.

The criteria used in evaluating arguments and their forms of reasoning are studied in logic. Ways of formulating arguments effectively are studied in rhetoric (see also: Argumentation theory).

Formal and informal arguments

Further information: Informal logic and Formal logic

Informal arguments as studied in informal logic, are presented in ordinary language and are intended for everyday discourse. Conversely, formal arguments are studied in formal logic (historically called symbolic logic, more commonly referred to as mathematical logic today) and are expressed in a formal language. Informal logic may be said to emphasize the study of argumentation, whereas formal logic emphasizes implication and inference. Informal arguments are sometimes implicit. That is, the logical structure—the relationship of claims, premises, warrants, relations of implication, and conclusion—is not always spelled out and immediately visible and must sometimes be
made explicit by analysis.

**Standard argument types**

There are several kinds of arguments in logic, the best-known of which are "deductive" and "inductive." These are sometimes referred to broadly as "truth-preserving" arguments, because they assert something about the truth of a particular claim. A deductive argument asserts that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises. An inductive argument, on the other hand, asserts that the truth of the conclusion is supported by the premises. Each premise and the conclusion are truth bearers or "truth-candidates", capable of being either true or false (and not both). While statements in an argument are referred to as being either true or false, arguments are referred to as being valid or invalid (see logical truth). A deductive argument is valid if and only if the truth of the conclusion is entailed by (is a logical consequence of) the premises, and its corresponding conditional is therefore a logical truth. A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises; a valid argument may well have false premises.

**Deductive arguments**

A *deductive argument* is one that, if valid, has a conclusion that is entailed by its premises. In other words, the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises—if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. It would be self-contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion, because the negation of the conclusion is contradictory to the truth of the premises.

**Validity**

Deductive arguments may be either valid or invalid. If an argument is valid, and its premises are true, the conclusion must be true: a valid argument cannot have true premises and a false conclusion.

The validity of an argument depends, however, not on the actual truth or falsity of its premises and conclusions, but solely on whether or not the argument has a valid logical form. The validity of an argument is not a guarantee of the truth of its conclusion. A valid argument may have false premises and a false conclusion.

Logic seeks to discover the valid forms, the forms that make arguments valid arguments. An argument form is valid if and only if all arguments of that form are valid. Since the validity of an argument depends on its form, an argument can be shown to be invalid by showing that its form is invalid, and this can be done by giving another argument of the same form that has true premises but a false conclusion. In informal logic this is called a counter argument.

The form of argument can be shown by the use of symbols. For each argument form, there is a corresponding statement form, called a corresponding conditional, and an argument form is valid if and only its corresponding conditional is a logical truth. A statement form which is logically true is also said to be a valid statement form. A statement form is a logical truth if it is true under all interpretations. A statement form can be shown to be a logical truth by either (a) showing that it is a tautology or (b) by means of a proof procedure.

The corresponding conditional of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premises.

For example:

*Some Greeks are logicians; therefore, some logicians are Greeks.* Valid argument; it would be self-contradictory to admit that some Greeks are logicians but deny that some (any) logicians are Greeks.

*All Greeks are human and all humans are mortal; therefore, all Greeks are mortal.* : Valid argument; if the premises are true the conclusion must be true.
Some Greeks are logicians and some logicians are tiresome; therefore, some Greeks are tiresome. Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be Romans (for example).

Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved; therefore, we are all doomed. Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that this does not mean the conclusion has to be true; it is only true if the premises are true, which they may not be!)

Premise 1: Some men are hawkers. Premise 2: Some hawkers are rich. Conclusion: Some men are rich.
This argument is invalid. There is a way where you can determine whether an argument is valid, give a counter-example with the same argument form.

Counter-Example: Premise 1: Some people are herbivores. Premise 2: Some herbivores are zebras. Conclusion: Some people are zebras. (This is obviously false.)

Note that the counter-example follows the P1. Some x are y. P2. Some y are z. C. Some x are z. format. We can now conclude that the hawker argument is invalid.

Arguments can be invalid for a variety of reasons. There are well-established patterns of reasoning that render arguments that follow them invalid; these patterns are known as formal fallacies.

**Soundness**
A sound argument is a valid argument whose conclusion follows from its premise(s), and the premise(s) of the argument are true.

**Inductive arguments**
Non-deductive logic is reasoning using arguments in which the premises support the conclusion but do not entail it. Forms of non-deductive logic include the statistical syllogism, which argues from generalizations true for the most part, and induction, a form of reasoning that makes generalizations based on individual instances. An inductive argument is said to be cogent if and only if the truth of the argument's premises would render the truth of the conclusion probable (i.e., the argument is strong), and the argument's premises are, in fact, true. Cogency can be considered inductive logic's analogue to deductive logic's "soundness." Despite its name, mathematical induction is not a form of inductive reasoning. The problem of induction is the philosophical question of whether inductive reasoning is valid.

**Defeasible arguments**
An argument is defeasible when additional information (such as new counterreasons) can have the effect that it no longer justifies its conclusion. The term "defeasibility" goes back to the legal theorist H.L.A. Hart, although he focused on concepts instead of arguments. Stephen Toulmin’s influential argument model includes the possibility of counterreasons that are characteristic of defeasible arguments, but he did not discuss the evaluation of defeasible arguments. Defeasible arguments give rise to defeasible reasoning.

**Argument by analogy**
Argument by analogy may be thought of as argument from the particular to particular. An argument by analogy may use a particular truth in a premise to argue towards a similar particular truth in the conclusion. For example, if A. Plato was mortal, and B. Socrates was like Plato in other respects, then asserting that C. Socrates was mortal is an example of argument by analogy because the reasoning employed in it proceeds from a particular truth in a premise (Plato was mortal) to a similar particular truth in the conclusion, namely that Socrates was mortal.  

\[10\]
**Transitional arguments**

In epistemology, transitional arguments attempt to show that a particular explanation is better than another because it is able to make sense of a transition from old to new. That is, if explanation $b$ can account for the problems that existed with explanation $a$, but not vice versa, then $b$ is regarded to be the more reasonable explanation. A common example in the history of science is the transition from pre-Galilean to Galilean understandings of physical motion.\[^{11}\]

**Other kinds of arguments**

Other kinds of arguments may have different or additional standards of validity or justification. For example, Charles Taylor writes that so-called transcendental arguments are made up of a "chain of indispensability claims" that attempt to show why something is necessarily true based on its connection to our experience,\[^{12}\] while Nikolas Kompridis has suggested that there are two types of "fallible" arguments: one based on truth claims, and the other based on the time-responsive disclosure of possibility (see world disclosure).\[^{13}\] The late French philosopher Michel Foucault is said to have been a prominent advocate of this latter form of philosophical argument.\[^{14}\]

**Argument in informal logic**

Argument is an informal calculus, relating an effort to be performed or sum to be spent, to possible future gain, either economic or moral.

In informal logic, an argument is a connexion between

a) an *individual* action

b) through which a *generally accepted* good is obtained.

Ex :

1. a) You should marry Jane (individual action, individual decision)
   b) because she has the same temper as you. (generally accepted wisdom that marriage is good in itself, and it is generally accepted that people with the same character get along well).

1. a) You should not smoke (individual action, individual decision)
   b) because smoking is harmful (generally accepted wisdom that health is good).

The argument is neither a) *advice* nor b) *moral or economical judgement*, but the connection between the two. An argument always uses the connective *because*. An argument is not an *explanation*. It does not connect two events, cause and effect, which already took place, but a possible individual action and its beneficial outcome. An argument is not a *proof*. A proof is a logical and cognitive concept; an argument is a praxeologic concept. A proof changes our knowledge; an argument compels us to act.

**Logical status of argument**

Argument does not belong to logic, because it is connected to a real person, a real event, and a real effort to be made.

a) If you, John, will buy this stock, it will become twice as valuable in a year. b) If you, Mary, study dance, you will become a famous ballet dancer.

The value of the argument is connected to the immediate circumstances of the person spoken to. If, in the first case, (a) John has no money, or will die the next year, he will not be interested in buying the stock. If, in the second case (b) she is too heavy, or too old, she will not be interested in studying and becoming a dancer. The argument is not logical, but profitable.
World-disclosing arguments

World-disclosing arguments are a group of philosophical arguments that are said to employ a disclosive approach, to reveal features of a wider ontological or cultural-linguistic understanding – a "world," in a specifically ontological sense – in order to clarify or transform the background of meaning and "logical space" on which an argument implicitly depends.\[15\]

Explanations and arguments

While arguments attempt to show that something is, will be, or should be the case, explanations try to show why or how something is or will be. If Fred and Joe address the issue of whether or not Fred's cat has fleas, Joe may state: "Fred, your cat has fleas. Observe the cat is scratching right now." Joe has made an argument that the cat has fleas. However, if Fred and Joe agree on the fact that the cat has fleas, they may further question why this is so and put forth an explanation: "The reason the cat has fleas is that the weather has been damp." The difference is that the attempt is not to settle whether or not some claim is true, it is to show why it is true.

Arguments and explanations largely resemble each other in rhetorical use. This is the cause of much difficulty in thinking critically about claims. There are several reasons for this difficulty.

• People often are not themselves clear on whether they are arguing for or explaining something.
• The same types of words and phrases are used in presenting explanations and arguments.
• The terms 'explain' or 'explanation,' et cetera are frequently used in arguments.
• Explanations are often used within arguments and presented so as to serve as arguments.\[16\]

Explanations and arguments are often studied in the field of Information Systems to help explain user acceptance of knowledge-based systems. Certain argument types may fit better with personality traits to enhance acceptance by individuals.\[17\]

Fallacies and nonarguments

A fallacy is an invalid argument that appears valid, or a valid argument with disguised assumptions. First the premises and the conclusion must be statements, capable of being true and false. Secondly it must be asserted that the conclusion follows from the premises. In English the words therefore, so, because and hence typically separate the premises from the conclusion of an argument, but this is not necessarily so. Thus: Socrates is a man, all men are mortal therefore Socrates is mortal is clearly an argument (a valid one at that), because it is clear it is asserted that Socrates is mortal follows from the preceding statements. However I was thirsty and therefore I drank is NOT an argument, despite its appearance. It is not being claimed that I drank is logically entailed by I was thirsty. The therefore in this sentence indicates for that reason not it follows that.

Elliptical arguments

Often an argument is invalid because there is a missing premise--the supply of which would render it valid. Speakers and writers will often leave out a strictly necessary premise in their reasonings if it is widely accepted and the writer does not wish to state the blindingly obvious. Example: All metals expand when heated, therefore iron will expand when heated. (Missing premise: iron is a metal). On the other hand, a seemingly valid argument may be found to lack a premise – a 'hidden assumption' – which if highlighted can show a fault in reasoning. Example: A witness reasoned: Nobody came out the front door except the milkman; therefore the murderer must have left by the back door. (Hidden assumption- the milkman was not the murderer).
Notes

[1] "Argument", Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” (http://www.iep.utm.edu/argument/) “In everyday life, we often use the word “argument” to mean a verbal dispute or disagreement. This is not the way this word is usually used in philosophy. However, the two uses are related. Normally, when two people verbally disagree with each other, each person attempts to convince the other that his or her viewpoint is the right one. Unless he or she merely results to name calling or threats, he or she typically presents an argument for his or her position, in the sense described above. In philosophy, “arguments” are those statements a person makes in the attempt to convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given conclusion.”


[4] The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Ed. CUM, 1995 “Argument: a sequence of statements such that some of them (the premises) purport to give reason to accept another of them, the conclusion”


[7] Charles Taylor, "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments", Philosophical Arguments (Harvard, 1995), 20-33. "[Transcendental] arguments consist of a string of what one could call indispensability claims. They move from their starting points to their conclusions by showing that the condition stated in the conclusion is indispensable to the feature identified at the start… Thus we could spell out Kant's transcendental deduction in the first edition in three stages: experience must have an object, that is, be of something; for this it must be coherent; and to be coherent it must be shaped by the understanding through the categories.”


[14] In addition, Foucault said of his own approach that "My role... is to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed." He also wrote that he was engaged in "the process of putting historico-critical reflection to the test of concrete practices... I continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labor giving form to our impatience for liberty." (emphasis added) Hubert Dreyfus, " Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault (http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_being.html)" and Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" (http://foucault.info/documents/whatIsEnlightenment/foucault. whatIsEnlightenment.en.html)


[16] Critical Thinking, Parker and Moore


References

- Robert Audi, Epistemology, Routledge, 1998. Particularly relevant is Chapter 6, which explores the relationship between knowledge, inference and argument.
- J. L. Austin How to Do Things With Words, Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Yu. Manin, A Course in Mathematical Logic, Springer Verlag, 1977. A mathematical view of logic. This book is different from most books on mathematical logic in that it emphasizes the mathematics of logic, as opposed to the formal structure of logic.
• L. S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, Methuen and Co., 1948. An account of logic that covers the classic topics of logic and argument while carefully considering modern developments in logic.

**Further reading**


**External links**

• *Argument* (http://philpapers.org/browse/argument) at PhilPapers
• *Argument* (https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/idea/1437) at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• *Argument* (http://www.iep.utm.edu/argument) entry in the *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*
Charles Arthur Willard

Charles Arthur Willard (born 1945) is an American argumentation and rhetorical theorist. He received his doctorate at the University of Illinois, Urbana, USA, in 1972. From 1974 to 1982 he was the Director of Forensics at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire (USA). He has lectured in Austria, Canada, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. He is Professor and University Scholar at the University of Louisville in Louisville, Kentucky, USA.

His published works include Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge (1982) and A Theory of Argumentation (1988). He has published monographs in and served on editorial boards for Communication Monographs, Informal Logic, Journal of the American Forensics Association, Argumentation, Social Epistemology and the Quarterly Journal of Speech. He has published more than 50 articles and book chapters on topics in rhetoric and argumentation. He was a co-director of the International Association for the Study of Argumentation based at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. He has received distinguished scholarship awards from the National Communication Association, the American Forensics Association, and the Universities of Illinois and Louisville.

His Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy (1996) debunks the discourse of liberalism, arguing that its exaggerated ideals of authenticity, unity, and community have deflected attention from the pervasive incompetence of the rule by experts. He proposes a ground of communication that emphasizes common interests rather than narrow disputes.

Selected works

This is an incomplete list, which may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by with reliably sourced entries.

- 1982 — Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge, University of Alabama Press
- 1982 — Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (with J. Robert Cox)
Notes


Social epistemology

Social epistemology is a broad set of approaches to the study of knowledge, all of which construe human knowledge as a collective achievement. Another way of positioning social epistemology is as the study of the social dimensions of knowledge. One of the enduring difficulties with defining social epistemology is defining what knowledge means in this context. There is also a challenge in arriving at a definition of social which satisfies academics from different disciplines. Social epistemologists may be found working in many of the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, most commonly in philosophy and sociology. In addition to marking a distinct movement in traditional, analytic epistemology, social epistemology is associated with the interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology Studies (STS).

The emergence of social epistemology

The term "social epistemology" was first used by the library scientists Margaret Egan and Jesse Shera in the 1950s. Steven Shapin also used it in 1979. But its current sense began to emerge in the late 1980s. In 1987, the philosophical journal Synthese published a special issue on social epistemology, which would include two authors that have since taken the discipline in two divergent directions: Alvin Goldman and Steve Fuller. Fuller founded a journal called Social Epistemology: a journal of knowledge, culture, and policy in 1987 and published his first book, Social Epistemology, in 1988. Goldman's Knowledge in a Social World came out in 1999; he is currently editor of the journal Episteme: a journal of social epistemology, which was founded in 2004. While the aims and scope of these two journals overlap in many respects, Social Epistemology is more open to science studies in addition to philosophy, while "the principal style [of Episteme] is that of analytical philosophy". Goldman advocates for a type of epistemology which is sometimes called veritistic epistemology because of its large emphasis on truth. This type of epistemology is sometimes seen to side with "essentialism" as opposed to "multiculturalism". But Goldman has argued that this association between veritistic epistemology and essentialism is not necessary.

The basic view of knowledge that motivated the emergence of social epistemology can be traced to the work of Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault, which gained in prominence at the end of the 1960s. Both brought historical concerns directly to bear on problems long associated with the philosophy of science. Perhaps the most notable issue here was the nature of truth, which both Kuhn and Foucault described as a relative and contingent notion. On this background, ongoing work in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the history and philosophy of science (HPS) was able to assert its epistemological consequences, leading most notably to the establishment of the "Strong Programme" at the University of Edinburgh. In terms of the two strands of social epistemology, Fuller is more sensitive and receptive to this historical trajectory (if not always in agreement) than Goldman, whose self-styled 'veritistic' social epistemology can be reasonably read as a systematic rejection of the more extreme claims associated with Kuhn and Foucault.
Present and future concerns

At this stage, both varieties of social epistemology remain largely "academic" or "theoretical" projects. But both emphasise the social significance of knowledge and therefore the cultural value of social epistemology itself. Both journals, for example, welcome papers that include a policy dimension. More practical applications of social epistemology can be found in the areas of library science, academic publishing, knowledge policy and debates over the role over the Internet in knowledge transmission and creation.

Notes

4. Social Epistemology, Steve Fuller, Indiana University Press, p. 3.

References


External links

• Social epistemology (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/) entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Social epistemology (http://philpapers.org/browse/social-epistemology) at PhilPapers
• Social epistemology (https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/taxonomy/2379) at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
• The journal Social Epistemology (http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/02691728.asp)
• The journal Episteme (http://www.episteme.us.com)
Sociology of knowledge

The Sociology of knowledge is the study of the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises, and of the effects prevailing ideas have on societies. It is not a specialized area of sociology but instead deals with broad fundamental questions about the extent and limits of social influences on individual’s lives and the social-cultural basics of our knowledge about the world.[1]

The sociology of knowledge was pioneered primarily by the sociologists Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Their works deal directly with how conceptual thought, language, and logic could be influenced by the sociological milieu out of which they arise. In *Primitive Classification* Durkheim and Mauss take a study of “primitive” group mythology to argue that systems of classification are collectively based and that the divisions with these systems are derived from social categories.[2]

While neither author specifically coined nor used the term ‘sociology of knowledge’, their work is an important first contribution to the field.

The specific term ‘sociology of knowledge’ first came into widespread use in the 1920s, when a number of German-speaking sociologists, most notably Max Scheler, and Karl Mannheim, wrote extensively on it. With the dominance of functionalism through the middle years of the 20th century, the sociology of knowledge tended to remain on the periphery of mainstream sociological thought. It was largely reinvented and applied much more closely to everyday life in the 1960s, particularly by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann in *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) and is still central for methods dealing with qualitative understanding of human society (compare socially constructed reality). The ‘genealogical’ and ‘archaeological’ studies of Michel Foucault are of considerable contemporary influence.

Schools

**Émile Durkheim**

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) is credited as having been the first professor to successfully establish the field of sociology, institutionalizing a department of sociology at the Université de Bordeaux in the 1890s.[3] While his works deal with a number of subjects, including suicide, the family, social structures, and social institutions, a large part of his work deals with the sociology of knowledge. In 1902, he published, with Marcel Mauss, *De quelques formes primitives de classification*, an essay that examines how the various ways in which a society is organized structurally impacts the formation of a society’s categories and logical grouping systems.

Building on his early work with Mauss, Durkheim’s definitive statement concerning the sociology of knowledge comes in his magnum opus *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. This book has as its goal not only the elucidation of the social origins and function of religion, but also the social origins and impact of society on language and logical thought. In it, Durkheim argues that religious beliefs require people to separate life into categories of the sacred and the profane, and that rites and rituals are necessary to mark the transition between these two spheres.[4] Here, Durkheim outlines how totemism within an Australian aboriginal religion is an example of how collective representations are enacted through religion.[5] A totem is a representation of the clan, which embodies all the characteristics of the group and around which rites and rituals take place.[6] It is through these rituals that religion is enacted and reinforced, creating a collective understanding of reality.

One of the most important elements of Durkheim’s theory knowledge is his concept of *représentations collectives* (collective representations), which is outlined in *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. *Représentations collectives* are the symbols and images that come to represent the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a collectivity and are not reducible to individual constituents. They can include words, slogans, ideas, or any number of material items that can serve as a symbol, such as a cross, a rock, a temple, a feather etc. As Durkheim elaborates,
représentations collectives are created through the intense interaction of religious rituals. They are products of collective activity and as such these representations have the particular, and somewhat contradictory, aspect that they exist externally to the individual (since they are created and controlled not by the individual but by society as a whole), and yet simultaneously within each individual of the society (by virtue of that individual's participation within society). Through représentations collectives the group exerts pressure on the individual to conform to society's norms of morality and thought. As such, collective representations help to order and make sense of the world, but they also express, symbolize and interpret social relationships.

Karl Mannheim

The German political philosophers Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) argued in Die deutsche Ideologie (1846, German Ideology) and elsewhere that people's ideologies, including their social and political beliefs and opinions, are rooted in their class interests, and more broadly in the social and economic circumstances in which they live:

"It is men, who in developing their material inter-course, change, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Being is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by being" (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe 1/5).

Under the influence of this doctrine, and of Phenomenology, the Hungarian-born German sociologist Karl Mannheim (1893–1947) gave impetus to the growth of the sociology of knowledge with his Ideologie und Utopie (1929, translated and extended in 1936 as Ideology and Utopia), although the term had been introduced five years earlier by the co-founder of the movement, the German philosopher, phenomenologist and social theorist Max Scheler (1874–1928), in Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens (1924, Attempts at a Sociology of Knowledge).

Mannheim feared that this interpretation could be seen to claim that all knowledge and beliefs are the products of socio-political forces since this form of relativism is self-defeating (if it is true, then it too is merely a product of socio-political forces and has no claim to truth and no persuasive force). Mannheim believed that relativism was a strange mixture of modern and ancient beliefs in that it contained within itself a belief in an absolute truth which was true for all times and places (the ancient view most often associated with Plato) and condemned other truth claims because they could not achieve this level of objectivity (an idea gleaned from Marx). Mannheim sought to escape this problem with the idea of 'relationism'. This is the idea that certain things are true only in certain times and places (a view influenced by pragmatism) however, this does not make them less true. Mannheim felt that a stratum of free-floating intellectuals (who he claimed were only loosely anchored to the class structure of society) could most perfectly realize this form of truth by creating a "dynamic synthesis" of the ideologies of other groups.

Phenomenological Sociology

Phenomenological Sociology is the study of the formal structures of concrete social existence as made available in and through the analytical description of acts of intentional consciousness. The "object" of such an analysis is the meaningful lived world of everyday life: the "Lebenswelt", or Life-world (Husserl:1889). The task, like that of every other phenomenological investigation, is to describe the formal structures of this object of investigation in subjective terms, as an object-constituted-in-and-for-consciousness (Gurwitsch:1964). That which makes such a description different from the "naive" subjective descriptions of the man in the street, or those of the traditional, positivist social scientist, is the utilization of phenomenological methods.

The leading proponent of Phenomenological Sociology was Alfred Schutz [1899-1959]. Schutz sought to provide a critical philosophical foundation for Max Weber's interpretive sociology through the use of phenomenological methods derived from the transcendental phenomenological investigations of Edmund Husserl [1859-1938]. Husserl's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of intentional consciousness. Schutz's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of the Life-world (Schutz:1980). Husserl's work was conducted as a transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Schutz's work was conducted as a mundane phenomenology of the
Life-world (Natanson:1974). The difference in their research projects lies at the level of analysis, the objects taken as topics of study, and the type of phenomenological reduction that is employed for the purposes of analysis.

Ultimately, the two projects should be seen as complementary, with the structures of the latter dependent on the structures of the former. That is, valid phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the Life-world should be wholly consistent with the descriptions of the formal structures of intentional consciousness. It is from the latter that the former derives its validity and truth value (Sokolowski:2000).

The phenomenological tie-in with the sociology of knowledge stems from two key historical sources for Mannheim's analysis: [1] Mannheim was dependent on insights derived from Husserl's phenomenological investigations, especially the theory of meaning as found in Husserl's Logical Investigations of 1900/1901 (Husserl:2000), in the formulation of his central methodological work: "On The Interpretation of Weltanschauung" (Mannheim:1993:see fn41 & fn43) - this essay forms the centerpiece for Mannheim's method of historical understanding and is central to his conception of the sociology of knowledge as a research program; and [2] The concept of "Weltanschauung" employed by Mannheim has its origins in the hermeneutic philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, who relied on Husserl's theory of meaning (above) for his methodological specification of the interpretive act (Mannheim: 1993: see fn38).

It is also noteworthy that Husserl's analysis of the formal structures of consciousness, and Schuetz's analysis of the formal structures of the Life-world are specifically intended to establish the foundations, in consciousness, for the understanding and interpretation of a social world which is subject to cultural and historical change. The phenomenological position is that although the facticity of the social world may be culturally and historically relative, the formal structures of consciousness, and the processes by which we come to know and understand this facticity, are not. That is, the understanding of any actual social world is unavoidably dependent on understanding the structures and processes of consciousness that found, and constitute, any possible social world.

Alternatively, if the facticity of the social world and the structures of consciousness prove to be culturally and historically relative, then we are at an impasse in regard to any meaningful scientific understanding of the social world which is not subjective (as opposed to being objective and grounded in nature [positivism], or inter subjective and grounded in the structures of consciousness [phenomenology]), and relative to the cultural and idealization formations of particular concrete individuals living in a particular socio-historical group.

**Michel Foucault**

A particularly important contemporary contribution to the sociology of knowledge is found in the work of Michel Foucault. **Madness and Civilization** (1961) postulated that conceptions of madness and what was considered "reason" or "knowledge" was itself subject to major culture bias - in this respect mirroring similar criticisms by Thomas Szasz, at the time the foremost critic of psychiatry, and himself now an eminent psychiatrist. A point where Foucault and Szasz agreed was that sociological processes played the major role in defining "madness" as an "illness" and prescribing "cures". In **The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception** (1963), Foucault extended his critique to institutional clinical medicine, arguing for the central conceptual metaphor of "The Gaze", which had implications for medical education, prison design, and the carceral state as understood today. Concepts of criminal justice and its intersection with medicine were better developed in this work than in Szasz and others, who confined their critique to current psychiatric practice. **The Order of Things** (1966) and **The Archeology of Knowledge** (1969) introduced abstract notions of mathesis and taxonomia to explain the subjective 'ordering' of the human sciences. These, he claimed, had transformed 17th and 18th century studies of "general grammar" into modern "linguistics", "natural history" into modern "biology", and "analysis of wealth" into modern "economics"; though not, claimed Foucault, without loss of meaning. According to Foucault, the 19th century transformed what knowledge was.

Perhaps Foucault's best-known claim was that "Man did not exist" before the 18th century. Foucault regarded notions of humanity and of humanism as inventions of modernity. Accordingly, a cognitive bias had been introduced unwittingly into science, by over-trusting the individual doctor or scientist's ability to see and state things
objectively. Foucault roots this argument in the rediscovery of Kant, though his thought is significantly influenced by Nietzsche - that philosopher declaring the "death of God" in the 19th century, and the anti-humanists proposing the "death of Man" in the 20th.

In *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison*, Foucault concentrates on the correlation between knowledge and power. According to him, knowledge is a form of power and can conversely be used against individuals as a form of power. As a result, knowledge is socially constructed in order to maintain the power of the ruling class. He argues that knowledge forms discourses and discourses form the dominant ideological ways of thinking which govern our lives. For him, social control is maintained in 'the disciplinary society', through codes of control over sexuality and the ideas/knowledge perpetuated through social institutions. In other words, discourses and ideologies subject us to authority and turn people into 'subjected beings', who are in turn afraid of being punished if they sway from social norms. Foucault believes that institutions overtly regulate and control our lives. Institutions such as schools reinforce the dominant ideological forms of thinking onto the populace and force us into becoming obedient and docile beings. Hence, the dominant ideology that serves the interests of the ruling class, all the while appearing as 'neutral', needs to be questioned and must not go unchallenged.

**Knowledge ecology**

Knowledge ecology is a concept originating from knowledge management and that aimed at "bridging the gap between the static data repositories of knowledge management and the dynamic, adaptive behavior of natural systems", and in particular relying on the concept of interaction and emergence. Knowledge ecology, and its related concept information ecology has been elaborated by different academics and practitioners such as Thomas H. Davenport, Bonnie Nardi, or Swidler.

**New Sociology of Knowledge**

The New Sociology of Knowledge introduces new concepts that dictate how knowledge is socialized in the modern era by new kinds of social organizations and structures.

**Robert K. Merton**

American sociologist Robert K. Merton (1910–2003) dedicates a section of Social Theory and Social Structure (1949; revised and expanded, 1957 and 1968) to the study of the sociology of knowledge in Part III, titled *The Sociology of Knowledge and Mass Communications*.

**References**


Doug Walton

For the rugby league footballer of the 1960s and '70s for Great Britain, Yorkshire, and Castleford, see Douglas "Doug" Walton

Doug Neil Walton is a Canadian academic and author, well known for his many widely published books and papers on argumentation, logical fallacies and informal logic. Walton teaches logic, published numerous books, and has written many papers. He holds the Assumption Chair in Argumentation Studies and Distinguished Research Fellow of the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation and Rhetoric at the University of Windsor, Canada. He gained his BA at University of Waterloo, Ontario (1964) and his PhD at University of Toronto (1972). He taught for many years at the University of Winnipeg, in Manitoba.

Walton's work has been used to better prepare legal arguments and to help develop artificial intelligence. His books have been translated worldwide and he attracts students from many countries to study with him. A festschrift honoring his work was published in 2010.[1]

Most of Walton's books are about logical fallacies, some of them co-authored with John Woods. According to Frans H. van Eemeren, who calls this body of work the Woods-Walton approach, this is "the most continuous and extensive post-Hamblin contribution to the study of fallacies".[2]

Books

The list of titles, from most recent to oldest are:

• Argumentation Schemes
• Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach
• Witness Testimony Evidence: Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence and Law
• Dialog Theory for Critical Argumentation
• Media Argumentation: Dialectic, Persuasion and Rhetoric
• Character Evidence: An Abductive Theory
• Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation
• Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law
• Abductive Reasoning
• Relevance in Argumentation
• Ethical Argumentation
• Legal Argumentation and Evidence
• Scare Tactics: Arguments that Appeal to Fear and Threats
• Appeal to Popular Opinion
• One-Sided Arguments: A Dialectical Analysis of Bias

• Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam
• Historical Foundations of Informal Logic
• Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory
• Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning
• Arguments from Ignorance
• Fallacies Arising from Ambiguity
• Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning
• A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy
• The Place of Emotion in Argument
• Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation
• Slippery Slope Arguments
• Begging the Question: Circular Reasoning as a Tactic of Argumentation
• Practical Reasoning: Goal-Driven, Knowledge-Based, Action-Guiding Argumentation
• Informal Logic: A Handbook for Critical Argumentation
• Question-Reply Argumentation
• Informal Fallacies
• Courage: A Philosophical Investigation
• Arguer’s Position: A Pragmatic Study of Ad Hominem Attack
• Criticism, Refutation, and Fallacy
• Physician-Patient Decision-Making
• Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies
• Ethics of Withdrawal of Life Support Systems
• Topical Relevance in Argumentation, and Brain Death: Ethical Considerations.

References

External links
• Personal webpage (http://www.dougwalton.ca/index.htm)
Informal logic

Informal logic, intuitively, refers to the principles of logic and logical thought outside of a formal setting. However, perhaps because of the informal in the title, the precise definition of informal logic is a matter of some dispute.\[^{[1]}\]

Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair define informal logic as "a branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation."\[^{[2]}\] This definition reflects what had been implicit in their practice and what others\[^{[3]}][^{[4]}][^{[5]}\] were doing in their informal logic texts.

Informal logic is associated with (informal) fallacies, critical thinking, the Thinking Skills Movement\[^{[6]}\] and the interdisciplinary inquiry known as argumentation theory. Frans H. van Eemeren writes that the label "informal logic" covers a "collection of normative approaches to the study of reasoning in ordinary language that remain closer to the practice of argumentation than formal logic."\[^{[7]}\]

History

Informal logic as a distinguished enterprise under this name emerged roughly in the late 1970s as a sub-field of philosophy. The naming of the field was preceded by the appearance of a number of textbooks that rejected the symbolic approach to logic on pedagogical grounds as inappropriate and unhelpful for introductory textbooks on logic for a general audience, for example Howard Kahane’s Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric, subtitled "The Use of Reason in Everyday Life", first published in 1971. Kahane’s textbook was described on the notice of his death in the Proceedings And Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (2002) as "a text in informal logic, [that] was intended to enable students to cope with the misleading rhetoric one frequently finds in the media and in political discourse. It was organized around a discussion of fallacies, and was meant to be a practical instrument for dealing with the problems of everyday life. [It has] ... gone through many editions; [it is] ... still in print; and the thousands upon thousands of students who have taken courses in which his text [was] ... used can thank Howard for contributing to their ability to dissect arguments and avoid the deceptions of deceitful rhetoric. He tried to put into practice the ideal of discourse that aims at truth rather than merely at persuasion. (Hausman et al. 2002)\[^{[8]}][^{[9]}\] Other textbooks from the era taking this approach were Michael Scriven’s Reasoning (Edgepress, 1976) and Logical Self-Defense by Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, first published in 1977.\[^{[8]}\] Earlier precursors in this tradition can be considered Monroe Beardsley’s Practical Logic (1950) and Stephen Toulmin’s The Uses of Argument (1958).\[^{[10]}\]

The field perhaps became recognized under its current name with the First International Symposium on Informal Logic held in 1978. Although initially motivated by a new pedagogical approach to undergraduate logic textbooks, the scope of the field was basically defined by a list of 13 problems and issues which Blair and Johnson included as an appendix to their keynote address at this symposium: \[^{[8]}][^{[11]}\]

- the theory of logical criticism
- the theory of argument
- the theory of fallacy
- the fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach
- the viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy
- the ethics of argumentation and logical criticism
- the problem of assumptions and missing premises
- the problem of context
- methods of extracting arguments from context
- methods of displaying arguments
- the problem of pedagogy
- the nature, division and scope of informal logic
Informal logic

• the relationship of informal logic to other inquiries

David Hitchcock argues that the naming of the field was unfortunate, and that *philosophy of argument* would have been more appropriate. He argues that more undergraduate students in North America study informal logic than any other branch of philosophy, but that as of 2003 informal logic (or philosophy of argument) was not recognized as separate sub-field by the World Congress of Philosophy.\[^8\] Frans H. van Eemeren wrote that "informal logic" is mainly an approach to argumentation advanced by a group of US and Canadian philosophers and largely based on the previous works of Stephen Toulmin and to a lesser extent those of Chaïm Perelman.\[^7\]

Alongside the symposia, since 1983 the journal *Informal Logic* has been the publication of record of the field, with Blair and Johnson as initial editors, with the editorial board now including two other colleagues from the University of Windsor—Christopher Tindale and Hans V. Hansen.\[^12\] Other journals that regularly publish articles on informal logic include *Argumentation* (founded in 1986), *Philosophy and Rhetoric, Argumentation and Advocacy* (the journal of the American Forensic Association), and *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines* (founded in 1988).\[^13\]

### Proposed definitions

Johnson and Blair (2000) proposed the following definition: "Informal logic designates that branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal\[^2\] standards, criteria, procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique and construction of argumentation in everyday discourse." Their meaning of non-formal\[^2\] is taken from Barth and Krabbe (1982), which is explained below.

To understand the definition above, one must understand "informal" which takes its meaning in contrast to its counterpart "formal." (This point was not made for a very long time, hence the nature of informal logic remained opaque, even to those involved in it, for a period of time.) Here it is helpful to have recourse\[^14\] to Barth and Krabbe (1982:14f) where they distinguish three senses of the term "form." By "form\(^1\)," Barth and Krabbe mean the sense of the term which derives from the Platonic idea of form—the ultimate metaphysical unit. Barth and Krabbe claim that most traditional logic is formal in this sense. That is, syllogistic logic is a logic of terms where the terms could naturally be understood as place-holders for Platonic (or Aristotelian) forms. In this first sense of "form," almost all logic is informal (not-formal). Understanding informal logic this way would be much too broad to be useful.

By "form\(^2\)," Barth and Krabbe mean the form of sentences and statements as these are understood in modern systems of logic. Here validity is the focus: if the premises are true, the conclusion must then also be true. Now validity has to do with the logical form of the statement that makes up the argument. In this sense of "formal," most modern and contemporary logic is "formal." That is, such logics canonize the notion of logical form, and the notion of validity plays the central normative role. In this second sense of form, informal logic is not-formal, because it abandons the notion of logical form as the key to understanding the structure of arguments, and likewise retires validity as normative for the purposes of the evaluation of argument. It seems to many that validity is too stringent a requirement, that there are good arguments in which the conclusion is supported by the premises even though it does not follow necessarily from them (as validity requires). An argument in which the conclusion is thought to be "beyond reasonable doubt, given the premises" is sufficient in law to cause a person to be sentenced to death, even though it does not meet the standard of logical validity. This type of argument, based on accumulation of evidence rather than pure deduction, is called a conductive argument.

By "form\(^3\)," Barth and Krabbe mean to refer to "procedures which are somehow regulated or regimented, which take place according to some set of rules." Barth and Krabbe say that "we do not defend formality\[^3\] of all kinds and under all circumstances." Rather "we defend the thesis that verbal dialectics must have a certain form (i.e., must proceed according to certain rules) in order that one can speak of the discussion as being won or lost" (19). In this third sense of "form", informal logic can be formal, for there is nothing in the informal logic enterprise that stands opposed to the idea that argumentative discourse should be subject to norms, i.e., subject to rules, criteria, standards or procedures. Informal logic does present standards for the evaluation of argument, procedures for detecting missing premises etc.
Johnson and Blair (2000) noticed a limitation of their own definition, particularly with respect to "everyday discourse", which could indicate that it does not seek to understand specialized, domain-specific arguments made in natural languages. Consequently, they have argued that the crucial divide is between arguments made in formal languages and those made in natural languages.

Fisher and Scriven (1997) proposed a more encompassing definition, seeing informal logic as "the discipline which studies the practice of critical thinking and provides its intellectual spine". By "critical thinking" they understand "skilled and active interpretation and evaluation of observations and communications, information and argumentation."[15]

Criticisms

Some hold the view that informal logic is not a branch or subdiscipline of logic, or even the view that there cannot be such a thing as informal logic.[16][17][18] Massey criticizes informal logic on the grounds that it has no theory underpinning it. Informal logic, he says, requires detailed classification schemes to organize it, which in other disciplines is provided by the underlying theory. He maintains that there is no method of establishing the invalidity of an argument aside from the formal method, and that the study of fallacies may be of more interest to other disciplines, like psychology, than to philosophy and logic.[16]

Relation to critical thinking

Since the 1980s, informal logic has been partnered and even equated,[19] in the minds of many, with critical thinking. The precise definition of "critical thinking" is a subject of much dispute.[20] Critical thinking, as defined by Johnson, is the evaluation of an intellectual product (an argument, an explanation, a theory) in terms of its strengths and weaknesses.[20] While critical thinking will include evaluation of arguments and hence require skills of argumentation including informal logic, critical thinking requires additional abilities not supplied by informal logic, such as the ability to obtain and assess information and to clarify meaning. Also, many believe that critical thinking requires certain dispositions.[21] Understood in this way, "critical thinking" is a broad term for the attitudes and skills that are involved in analyzing and evaluating arguments. The critical thinking movement promotes critical thinking as an educational ideal. The movement emerged with great force in the 80s in North America as part of an ongoing critique of education as regards the thinking skills not being taught.

Relation to argumentation theory

The social, communicative practice of argumentation can and should be distinguished from implication (or entailment)—a relationship between propositions; and from inference—a mental activity typically thought of as the drawing of a conclusion from premises. Informal logic may thus be said to be a logic of argumentation, as distinguished from implication and inference.[22]

Argumentation theory (or the theory of argumentation) has come to be the term that designates the theoretical study of argumentation. This study is interdisciplinary in the sense that no one discipline will be able to provide a complete account. A full appreciation of argumentation requires insights from logic (both formal and informal), rhetoric, communication theory, linguistics, psychology, and, increasingly, computer science. Since the 1970s, there has been significant agreement that there are three basic approaches to argumentation theory: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialectical. According to Wenzel,[23] the logical approach deals with the product, the dialectical with the process, and the rhetorical with the procedure. Thus, informal logic is one contributor to this inquiry, being most especially concerned with the norms of argument.
Footnotes


[9] JSTOR 3218569
[19] Johnson (2000) takes the conflation to be part of the Network Problem and holds that settling the issue will require a theory of reasoning.
[21] Ennis, 1987
[22] Johnson, 1999

References


**Special journal issue**

The open access issue 20(2) (http://www.phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/issue/view/277) of *Informal Logic* from year 2000 groups a number of papers addressing foundational issues, based on the Panel on Informal Logic that was held at the 1998 World Congress of Philosophy, including:


**Textbooks**


**External links**
• Informal Logic (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-informal) entry by Leo Groarke in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*

**Joseph W. Wenzel**

Joseph W. Wenzel (1933--) is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar. He is Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.[1]

He has lectured in Austria, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. He has published in *Communication Monographs, Journal of the American Forensic Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and Argumentation.*

His students include Dale Hample, Daniel J. O'Keefe, and Charles Arthur Willard. His seminal contribution to argument theory appears in 1979: ‘Jurgen Habermas and the Dialectical Perspective on Argumentation’, *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 16, 83–94. He has published 30 articles and book chapters on topics in rhetoric and argumentation. He received awards for publications from the Midwest Forensic Association and the American Forensic Association. He has been a frequent presenter at conferences in America and abroad, including a keynote address at the First International Conference on Argumentation in Amsterdam in 1986. He was Editor of the Journal of the American Forensic Association, 1983–86, and has served on the editorial boards of *Argumentation, Central States Speech Journal, Communication Monographs, Informal Logic and Quarterly Journal of Speech.* [2]

**References**

[1] http://www.communication.illinois.edu/faculty/people/jwenzel/
Daniel J. O'Keefe

Daniel J. O'Keefe (born 1950) is an American communication and argumentation theory scholar. He is the Owen L. Coon Professor in the Department of Communication Studies at Northwestern University. His research concerns persuasion and argumentation, with a focus on meta-analytic synthesis of research concerning persuasive message effects.[1] This program of work often addresses the question of whether normatively good argumentation contributes to persuasive success.


**Awards**

From the National Communication Association[2]:

- Charles Woolbert Research Award, 1986
- Golden Anniversary Monograph Award, 1982
- Rhetorical and Communication Theory Division Distinguished Scholar Award, 2005

From the American Forensic Association[3]:

- Daniel Rohrer Memorial Research Award, 1977

From the International Communication Association[4]:

- Health Communication Division Article of the Year Award, 2008
- Best Article Award, 2004
- Division 1 John E. Hunter Meta-Analysis Award, 2000

From the International Society for the Study of Argumentation[5]:

- Distinguished Scholar Award

From the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign[6]:

- Humanities Council Teaching Excellence Award, 1999

From Northwestern University[7]:

- Galbut Outstanding Faculty Award, School of Communication, 201

**References**

[1] Northwestern University School of Communication Faculty Page (http://www.communication.northwestern.edu/faculty/?PID=DanielOKeefe)
[6] University of Illinois College of LAS faculty award winners (http://www.las.uiuc.edu/faculty/awards/recipients/)
G. Thomas Goodnight

G. Thomas Goodnight is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar. He is a professor and director of doctoral studies in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California. He has published essays in Communication Monographs, Communication Theory, Journal of the American Forensic Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and Argumentation. He has lectured in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Netherlands. His seminal contribution to the field of argumentation theory lies in his approach to "spheres of argument," an idea that has sparked many scholarly studies. Before joining USC full-time in 2004, Goodnight taught undergraduate and graduate courses in Northwestern University's Communication Studies department in contemporary rhetorical theory, criticism, theory of argumentation, and the public sphere. His current research interests include deliberation and postwar society, science communication, argument and aesthetics, public discourse studies, and communicative reason in controversy.

Professor Goodnight has been named by the American Forensics Association as one of the top 5 scholars in argumentation in the twentieth century.[1]

References
[1] Peterson's graduate programs in the humanities, arts, & social sciences, 2006, p. 922

External links
• USC homepage (http://annenberg.usc.edu/Faculty/Communication/GoodnightG.aspx)

Robin Rowland

Robin Rowland (Robert C. Rowland) is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar. He is a professor in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Kansas.[1][2][3] He has published in Communication Monographs, Journal of the American Forensic Association, Quarterly Journal of Speech, and Argumentation.[4] Rowland was named the winner of the 2011 Douglas W. Ehninger Distinguished Rhetorical Scholar Award by the National Communication Association.

As a student at the University of Kansas Rowland and his partner Frank Cross won the National Debate Tournament, defeating Georgetown University. Rowland was named eighth outstanding speaker for the tournament.

References
http://www.news.ku.edu/2011/october/7/rowland.shtml
Dale Hample is an American argumentation and rhetorical scholar, associate Professor at the University of Maryland. He has published many peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and written one book and edited another.

After receiving a PhD at the University of Illinois in 1975, he taught at Western Illinois University until 2007, when he took a teaching position at Maryland. Some of his major accomplishments include developing measures for the ways in which people edit arguments (cognitive editorial standards), discussing how people produce argumentative discourse (inventional capacity), and how they view arguments (argument frames and taking conflict personally).

He is currently the editor of Argumentation and Advocacy,[1] and editor of the Issues Forum of Communication Monographs, and is on the editorial boards for ten other journals in his subject.

Publications

Books


Journal articles


Other publications
He has also published over two dozen chapters in specialized books and encyclopedias, and over 50 conference presentations.

References

External links
- Curriculum Vitae

References
[2] http://www.springerlink.com/content/qt252673382752g/

C. Scott Jacobs

Curtis Scott Jacobs, (Scott Jacobs), is an American argumentation, communication, and rhetorical scholar. He graduated from the University of Illinois with a Ph.d. He taught for many years at the University of Arizona. He is now Professor of Communication at the University of Illinois.[1] He has lectured in France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. He has contributed to the field of argumentation theory.


Works
Sally Jackson

Sally Jackson is an American scholar of argumentation, communication, and rhetoric. Dr. Jackson served as the chief information officer for the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,[1] but resigned from the position on April 8, 2011 due to disagreement with a change in administrative reporting lines.[2] She will remain at the university as a professor and associate provost.[3]


References

David Zarefsky

David Zarefsky (1946-) is an American communication scholar with research specialties in rhetorical history and criticism. He is professor emeritus at Northwestern University. He is a past president of the National Communication Association (USA) and the Rhetoric Society of America. Among his publications are six books and over 70 scholarly articles concerned with American public discourse (both historical and contemporary), argumentation, rhetorical criticism, and public speaking are books on the Lincoln-Douglas debates and on the rhetoric of the war on poverty during the Johnson administration. His lectures on argumentation and rhetoric can be heard in a course for The Teaching Company.

Early Education and Forensics Career


Following completion of his B.S., Zarefsky stayed at Northwestern to pursue advanced degrees in Speech and coach the debate team. During this period, his teams were regularly recognized as among the best in the nation, with the pair of Eliot Mincberg and Ron Marmer winning the 1973 NDT.[8] As a debate coach and judge, Zarefsky earned a reputation for his systematic and thorough approach. For example, he "sat for a full half hour reviewing his flow chart" before rendering the pivotal decision in the 1969 NDT semifinal round between Harvard University and Loyola University.[9] He made up for difficulty in spotting differences in the makes and models of cars by scanning university parking lots to find the license plate of his team's vehicle at any given tournament.[10]

Zarefsky pioneered a policy debate "judging paradigm" called "hypothesis testing," which spells out how debate judges can draw metaphorically upon the scientific method's process of weighing scientific conjectures and refutations.[11] Upon his retirement as Director of Forensics in 1975, Zarefsky was voted by his peers as the second best coach of the decade during the 1970s.[12]

Research and Teaching

Two of Zarefsky's books have won the Winans-Wichelns Award for Distinguished Scholarship in Rhetoric and Public Address, an award of the National Communication Association.[13][14]

Zarefsky has taught courses in the study of American public discourse, with a special focus on the pre-Civil War years and on the pre-Civil War years and on the 1960s. He also has taught courses in argumentation theory, persuasion, and public speaking. On thirteen different occasions he was named to the student government's honor roll for distinguished teaching. Zarefsky also has two video courses, "Abraham Lincoln: In His Own Words" and "Argumentation: The Study of Effective Reasoning," marketed by The Teaching Company.

Some of Zarefsky's more notable students include: University of California, Irvine Founding Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky; United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit federal appellate judge Merrick B. Garland; and former White House Chief of Staff and current Mayor of Chicago Rahm Emanuel. Asked about Emanuel's reputation for ruthlessness, Zarefsky was quoted in The Daily Northwestern as saying, "I think it can be applied to him in a positive sense because he's just very determined to achieve his goals."[15]
Administrative Leadership

Zarefsky joined the Northwestern faculty in 1968 and rose through the ranks, achieving promotion to Professor in 1982. He also has held a series of administrative appointments, including Chair of the Department of Communication Studies (1975-83), Associate Dean of the School of Speech (1983-88), and from 1988-2000, Dean of the School of Speech (later renamed the School of Communication), a 12-year tenure notable for its length among Northwestern deans serving during that era.[16] In 1993 Zarefsky served as president of the National Communication Association and in 2001 he received its Distinguished Service Award. He held the presidency of the Central States Communication in 1986-87. In 2006-2007 he served as president of the Rhetoric Society of America. He has held numerous leadership positions in the American Forensic Association, whose journal he edited from 1977-80. From 1984-89 he was the Director of the National Debate Tournament.

Recent Publications


References

[5] (http://www.caacd.uscourts.gov/caacd/CivilConsent.nsf/45f3d005cb8da0e882574f6005fc51a/525d1ef5e2ca1882574f60070d01f7?OpenDocument)
Ralph Johnson (philosopher)

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**Ralph H. Johnson** is a native of Detroit, Michigan. Johnson has been credited as one of the founding members of the informal logic movement in North America, along with J. Anthony Blair who co-published one of the movement’s most influential texts, “Logical Self-Defense,” with Johnson. As Johnson and Blair write in the preface to the newest edition of Logical Self-Defense on the influential nature of the text:

We might note that the theoretical perspective introduced in Logical Self-Defense has proved quite influential among textbook authors. It is to be found in modified form in A Practical Study of Argument by Trudy Govier, in Attacking Faulty Reasoning by T. Edward Damer, in Logic in Everyday Life and Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning by Zachary Seech, in Thinking Logically by James B. Freeman, and in Good Reasoning Matters by Leo Groarke and Christopher W. Tindale.

He earned an Honors Bachelor of Arts at Xavier University and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Notre Dame in 1972. He has been a University Professor and University Professor emeritus at the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada, where he had taught since 1966. He retired in Fall 2006 after 39 years, during which he served two terms as Head of Department. Ralph H. Johnson was a co-founder of the Newsletter of Informal Logic which has since become the Journal of Informal Logic in 1985, he also served as its co-editor along with J. Anthony Blair since its inception.

He has been a co-chair for the International Symposium on Informal Logic in Windsor in 1978, 1983, and 1989. Ralph H. Johnson has lectured and published widely on informal logic, fallacy theory, argumentation, and critical thinking. He is a founding member and has been a previous member of the Executive Committee of the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT); as well as of the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking (NCECT), and of the Canadian Research Group on Argumentation (Carga). In 2004 he co-founded the Network for the Study of Reasoning, a cluster of Canadian experts researching the theory and its applications of reasoning and argument. He has given workshop presentations and has been a consultant on informal logic and critical thinking across the United States and Canada.

According to the University of Windsor’s website, “His articles have appeared in such journals as American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Argumentation, Philosophy and Rhetoric and Informal Logic. In 1996, a collection of his articles and papers was published by Vale Press under the title The Rise of Informal Logic. In 2000, his book, Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Study of Argument, was published by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Johnson has conducted seminars and workshops on informal logic and critical thinking across North America and in Europe. In 1993, Johnson received a 3M Teaching Fellowship for outstanding university teachers, one of ten such awards conferred that year in Canada. In 1994, he was awarded the rank of University Professor by the University of Windsor. In 2000, he was awarded the Distinguished Research Award by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation. In 2003, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. In 2005, he received the Career
Achievement Award from the University of Windsor. Johnson is listed in Who’s Who in Canada."[14]
Currently, Johnson is working on a book about Dialectical Adequacy, which will be a follow up to his recently published work Manifest Rationality (2000).[15]

Personal life
From Johnson’s website, "I love to read, especially contemporary fiction. Among my favourite authors: John Updike, Alistair MacLeod, Joan Barfoot, Michael Connelly, Robert B. Parker. I love the plays of Shakespeare (especially King Lear), and attend the plays at Stratford every year. This year, I look forward to seeing Oliver and Much Ado about Nothing. I love to listen to music, especially classical. Currently I am in a Chopin phase. I also am drawn to the music of Bach, Beethoven, Haydn, Schubert and Dvorak. I belong to The Mankind Project (www.mkp.org) — a worldwide organization dedicated to calling men to consciousness and lives of service. I serve as an Elder and Board member in our local community. I exercise (jog, walk or bike) almost everyday. I have been married to my wife Maggie for 38 years; have three children (Mary, Sean and Matthew) and two grandchildren— Brandin, 11, and Ivy Grace b. January 27 2006!"[16]

Philosophy
As Johnson explains both in Logical Self-Defense as well as his journal article Making Sense of "Informal Logic," that Informal Logic is the philosophical practice of understanding and evaluating natural language argumentation. Here fallacies are used in order to evaluate arguments. However, more simply the idea is to evaluate arguments based upon three essential criteria, again as explained in both Making Sense of "Informal Logic," and more thoroughly explained in Logical Self-Defense, the premises of arguments must be relevant to the conclusion, sufficient to support it, and acceptable to the audience.[17] In this approach to logic, fallacies such as the straw man, red herring etc. point to a deficiency in the premises in one of these three criteria.
Johnson and Blair also place emphasis on how to identify arguments in everyday life, so that evaluators do not misinterpret the author’s intention. In this way Logical Self-Defense identifies several different ways of interpreting arguments and their 'look-alikes'. For instance Johnson and Blair explain the distinctions between mere opinion, proto-argument, argument, case, and explanation as well as provide criteria for helping to identify which is which, including: context, verbal cues and logical structure.[18]

In his article "Charity Begins at Home" in Informal Logic Johnson combines and creates unified form of the 'Principle of Charity’ which he found to exist in four other forms in the following works: Thomas’s Practical Reasoning in Natural Language (1973), Baum’s Logic (1975) and in Scriven’s Reasoning (1976). In doing so Johnson created a more developed ‘Principle of Charity’ which Informal Logicians could reference. [19]
Accordingly, in this article Section II attempts to unify these four versions by making one the foundation, while the others work as its corollaries. Then, after creating a better account of the ‘Principle of Charity’ Johnson spends Section III of the article addresses some of the issues involved in the application of the ‘Principle of Charity’ and finally Section IV addresses a proposed restriction for the use of the ‘Principle of Charity’.[20]
In his article “The Principle of Vulnerability” in Informal Logic seeks to offer defence to the principle that all arguments should be considered susceptible to criticisms. As such Johnson argues that the arguer of an argument should not seek to "immunize" their argument from criticism. The article also takes considerations both in support of, and opposed to the principle into account.[21]
In this article one of the more notable ideas presented is the notion of 'manifest rationality' which Johnson described in this way:
The practice (of arguing) is characterized by a trait I call manifest rationality. In the practice of argumentation, rationality is not merely the inner reality but also the outward appearance of the practice. The practice must not just be rational; it must also appear rational. This is why the Arguer is expected to respond to objections and criticisms
from others, and not ignore them or sweep them under the carpet. It's not just that sweeping them aside would not be rational and hence not be in keeping with the spirit of the practice. It's that it would be such an obvious violation of it—and it would be seen to be such.[22]

References

Michael Scriven

Michael Scriven (born 1928[^1]) is a British-born polymath and academic, best known for his contributions to the theory and practice of evaluation.

Background

Scriven has a first degree in mathematics from the University of Melbourne and a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Oxford.[^2] He has spent most of his career in the United States.

Scriven is a past president of the American Educational Research Association and the American Evaluation Association. He is also an editor and co-founder of the Journal of Multidisciplinary Evaluation. He is currently a professor at Claremont Graduate University.

Scholarly contributions

Scriven has made significant contributions in the fields of philosophy, psychology, critical thinking, mathematics, and, most notably, evaluation methods in public policy and the social sciences (he invented checklists for programme evaluation).

He has produced over 400 scholarly publications and has served on the editorial review boards of 42 journals.

Notes


External links

- http://www.michaelscriven.info personal webpage
- Michael Scriven's Faculty Page at Claremont Graduate University (http://www.cgu.edu/pages/4745.asp)
- The Journal of Multidisciplinary Evaluation (http://evaluation.wmich.edu/JMDE)
- EPAA Bio (http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/board/scriven.html)
- Scriven interview (http://www.gse.harvard.edu/hfrp/eval/issue24/expert.html)
John Hayden Woods (1937–) is a Canadian logician and philosopher, currently Director of the Abductive Systems Group at the University of British Columbia (UBC) and The UBC Honorary Professor of Logic. He has also been affiliated with the Group on Logic, Information and Computation, of the Department of Informatics from King's College London, where he hold the Charles S. Peirce Visiting Professorship of Logic position since 2001.

Woods is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, and Life member of the Association of Fellows of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, and President Emeritus of the University of Lethbridge.

Woods education includes an B.A. and M.A. in Philosophy from the University of Toronto, and a 1965 Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Michigan where his adviser was Arthur Burks.

Together with Douglas Walton, Woods has authored a number of books and papers on fallacies. According to Frans H. van Eemeren, who calls this body of work the Woods-Walton approach, this is "the most continuous and extensive post-Hamblin contribution to the study of fallacies".[1]

A festschrift honoring and discussing Woods' work was published din 2005 by University of Toronto Press; it also contains respondeos of Woods to the various papers and a profile of him in the form of an introduction.[2]

Selected books

Woods edited or co-edited a large number of books. Together with Dov Gabbay, Woods has been a co-editor of the eleven-volume *Handbook of the History of Logic*, published by North-Holland (now Elsevier), as well as editor, with Gabbay and Paul Thagard, of the sixteen-volume *Handbook of the Philosophy of Science*, by the same publisher.

Below are a some books authored by Woods.

References


- 12/7/09 CV (http://www.johnwoods.ca/cv.pdf)

External links

- Home page (http://www.johnwoods.ca/)